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Introduction 
When the latter Chancellor Helmut Schmidt introduced the term “Modell Deutschland” dur-
ing a national election campaign in 1976, it reflected the self-confidence of a political econo-
my apparently at the height of its evolution (Esser et al. 1979; Esser and Fach 1981). Disap-
pearing quickly from the German scene in the wake of economic difficulties, it was in fact 
foreign academics and journalists who kept the mythical keyword alive (e.g. Markovits 1982). 
The label gained new popularity during the 1990s, when attention turned to territorial capital-
ist variants (e.g. Albert 1992; Esping-Andersen 1994) and again more recently with the “va-
rieties of capitalism” approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). Difference in detail notwithstanding, 
there is agreement in the literature that the institutions formatting labor relations constitute a 
key building stone of the German Model (Bathelt and Gertler 2005; Berndt 2001). 
In today’s global age where the conditions allowing the production of quasi-natural national 
economies and societies have ceased to exist, the viability of territorial capitalist models is 
increasingly put into question. Applying a perspective which privileges mobility over stabili-
ty, this paper analyzes the dilemmas confronting the contemporary German political economy 
focusing on industrial and labor relations. I argue that the German Model was founded on a 
particular geographical compromise: Resting mainly on the mobility of goods, the country’s 
economic success crucially depended on an elaborate regime of limited cross-border mobility 
of production factors (labor, capital). Only this allowed the maintenance of the sedentary life-
styles and relatively high living standards of a core of the workforce. In addition to the global 
stretching of production systems and the tremendous pressure on unionized labor in the wake 
of it, it is the mobility of so-called “low skilled” labor which appears to contribute to the ero-
sion of the stable post-war territorial compromise. Criticizing the “methodological national-
ism” of predominantly defensive measures, I argue that recent changes notwithstanding deci-
sion-makers in Germany have not yet come to terms with the requirements of an increasingly 
connected world. Trapped territorially they instead unintentionally create new dilemmas for 
every problem they seek to solve. 
The paper starts with a brief reconstruction of the particular geography of the institutions un-
derpinning Modell Deutschland, putting emphasis on how it centered on territorial stability 
and a sedentary life-style for a majority of workers. Section two shifts the focus towards 
transnational labor geographies and the challenges these imply for more sedentary actors. I 
close the paper with a discussion of the dilemmas confronting decision-makers as they at-
tempt to reconcile a dated territorial with a still largely undefined transterritorial order.  
 
Modell Deutschland: The rise and fall of a territorial system of labor regulation 
Territorialization: The production of the “normal” worker 
The institutionalization of German capital-labor-relations cannot be separated from the histor-
ical project which, first, transformed a fragmented and loosely connected political mosaic of 
regional political entities into a territorial nation-state and, second, consolidated this relatively 
young territorial entity as a welfare state (Wohlfahrtsstaat). According to Claus Offe (1999, 
2003) the labor side of the German welfare state has four key features: The first concerns reg-
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ulations designed to protect the worker at the work-place and in the labor market. Early ex-
amples date back to the 19th century and include the temporal limitation of working life, 
working week and workday. The overriding concern was to protect the workers at work, ap-
parently justifying certain limitations imposed upon the freedom of contract.  
The second feature comprises all measures and programs that are designed to protect workers 
and also their dependent family members outside work with the specific German version of 
social security (Sozialversicherung). Ever wider segments of the workforce were included 
into the ranks of mandatory contributors to and beneficiaries of social security. This meant 
that the relationship between worker and employer is embedded in an order where a paternal-
ist state imposes duties (to contribute) and rights (to benefits) upon those subjects that per-
form the economic role of regular employees. Distinguishing this arrangement both from lib-
eral and from socialist variants, Offe (1999: 203) argues that this allowed the German state to 
mediate between the conflicting forces of a class-divided society.  
The third key feature of the German welfare state refers to the well-known institutions which 
safe-guard a particular way to determine the workers’ income, including collective wage bar-
gaining, strong actors on both sides of the labor market (the so-called social partners, i.e. labor 
unions and employers’ associations), Flächentarifverträge (= industry-wide regional collec-
tive agreements), Tarifautonomie (the constitutionally enshrined provision banning the state 
from directly interfering with wage determination) and strict time limits to the organization of 
strikes by unions.  
Finally, there is the period of consistently high levels of employment from 1955 to 1975 which 
provided the context in which the regulations governing social security and industrial rela-
tions were able to bring about their positive effects. Only with a large and stable base of fully 
employed workers were labor unions able to negotiate the pay rises and the increase of social 
protection so characteristic of that era. Together with the continuing economic boom this 
made labor a scarce “commodity”, providing incentives to maximize efficiency through tech-
nological innovations, to invest in training and skilling and to foster cooperative relations be-
tween workers and employers. Economists coined the term “Produktivitätspeitsche” (= prod-
uctivity whip), that is, a virtuous mechanism almost naturally leading to continuous growth. 
By defining a “standard employment relationship” (Normalarbeitsverhältnis), this institution-
al environment draws sharp borders between the insiders and outsiders of Modell Deut-
schland. Insider positions are assigned to those who belong to the “community of the in-
sured”, that is those covered by the social security system. Amongst the “outsiders” are above 
all workers in so-called atypical employment or those who in one way or another work in 
segments of the labor market deemed “informal” (i.e. illicit work, day labor, “undocumented” 
migrants). In so doing, the social security system produced a broad middle segment of the 
population in stable, full-time and life-long employment. I will illustrate below that it is this 
stable, sedentary segment of the workforce which is strongly affected by the current rearticu-
lation of German capitalism.  
The “standard” form of labor has an ambivalent meaning for those workers who come to 
Germany from abroad. On the one hand it provides migrants with a means with which to par-
ticipate in social life. Scholars argue that the labor market has been the primary mechanism of 
integration into a society which denies political participation (Häußermann and Siebel 2001). 
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On the other hand, this applies only to those in stable employment, with the important conse-
quence that the right to stay in Germany is jeopardized by job losses and unemployment. Still 
worse off are those migrants who are either excluded legally from the formal labor market 
(e.g. asylum seekers) or who meet the demand for unregulated, “informal” work which has 
always been a prominent feature in the German economy. It is no exaggeration therefore to 
conclude that the specific labor market arrangements of Modell Deutschland played a crucial 
role in the formation of an exclusionary national-territorial project (Markovits 1982: 6; 
Streeck 1997: 246). 
The demarcation of insider and outsider positions in the labor market and the corresponding 
social boundaries outlined above formed an indispensable part in the organization of the Ger-
man variant of capitalism and the consolidation of a society priding itself of its prosperous 
living conditions and social cohesion. Yet these social normalization and consolidation 
processes required a further step, that is, the projection of social homogenization to space via 
the process of territorialization. Referred to as “economic-giant-political-dwarf” by interna-
tional observers, the motor of postwar West Germany was an internationally open and aggres-
sively export-oriented economy. The German version of (neo)liberal integration into interna-
tional markets, however, rested solely on the mobility of goods. Underlying tensions between 
the wider German society and its capitalist economy, and also between labor and capital, were 
solved by striking a geographical compromise: The West German model “was conditional on 
limited mobility of production factors across borders” (Streeck 1997: 252). On the capital side 
this included the rise of large, interconnected industrial conglomerates and the famous indus-
trial Mittelstand, international players that still produced predominantly domestically when 
their US counterparts, for instance, already pursued outsourcing opportunities in Mexico, Hai-
ti, Taiwan or Hong Kong. As regards financial markets, Germany’s banks – whether large or 
small – concentrated their resources on the domestic market venturing abroad only belatedly. 
On the labor side this included the – ultimately unsuccessful – attempt to control the in-flow 
of low-skilled work and to see to it that the “lower” segment of the labor market remained of 
manageable size.  
The competitive performance of German high-wage capitalism therefore depended on the 
state’s capacity to control mobility and to police the boundaries of the social market economy. 
This in turn required continuous intervention by public and semi-public actors whose legiti-
mization was coded territorially: the state at various regional levels (Federal, Länder, region-
al), the complicated territorial division of labor defining the realms of the “social partners” 
(regional collective bargaining districts, multi-scalar organization of labor unions and em-
ployers’ associations), the regional hierarchy of the institutions administering the social secu-
rity systems and so on. With hindsight, economic and political decision-makers were relative-
ly successful in their policies of controlled mobility and the policing of social and spatial bor-
ders. However, the architecture of the German Model had an inbuilt weakness, its dependence 
on international markets and trade, that is, on processes which are difficult to control and con-
tain by actors firmly locked into the old territorial order (for earlier warnings, see Esser et al. 
1979; Markovits 1982). 
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Globalization: The dissolution of “normal” work and taken-for-granted certainties 
During the last 20 years or so political and economic decision-makers had to come to terms 
with the paradoxical situation that Germany’s main economic strength turned out to be the 
country’s Achilles Heel. The well-being of the German political economy continues to depend 
almost exclusively on the successful performance of the export sector. While the logics of 
global product and financial markets have changed dramatically compared to the inter-
national economy of the 1960s and 1970s, the institutional arrangement underpinning the 
post-war German economic success has only done so hesitantly. The result is a mismatch, 
with obvious geographical implications, between a globally integrated network economy and 
a regulatory regime firmly centered on national territorial institutions. 
If one attempts to come to terms with the numerous analyses and studies of Germany’s recent 
economic performance, it is easy to get lost. So contradictory are the interventions that one 
regularly gets empirical evidence for opposite claims. These debates often resemble attempts 
to read the coffee grounds, empirical results and policy recommendations influenced by the 
normative frames used to access statistical data and other information. It is not my intention to 
participate in this debate. Rather, I illustrate a wider process which is – different normative 
interpretations notwithstanding – largely undisputed: the reconfiguration of the institutional 
arrangements underpinning capital-labor-relations in Germany, and, more specifically, the 
erosion of the German labor union movement in the current global environment. 
The increasing porosity of the national economy can be illustrated with reference to two 
processes involving capital flows: The spatial reconfiguration of production and supply chains 
(outsourcing and offshoring) and the globalization of the German capital market, both having 
direct repercussions on labor relations. To start with the former, the transfer of work and pro-
duction steps to business units in third countries is a hotly debated phenomenon in the Ger-
man media. During the 1990s German manufacturing companies appear to have discovered 
the advantages of “contracting out”, above all the cost advantages of production sharing with 
Eastern European economies. Only very belatedly jumping the outsourcing bandwagon, 
transnational supply chain management strategies gained their momentum with the opening of 
Eastern European economies and the double advantage of low production costs and spatial 
proximity (“nearshoring”). 
As regards financial markets, there is ample evidence that the bank-based German financial 
system is currently undergoing fundamental change, reflected in the increasing influence of 
foreign institutional investors in large German companies, the turbulences surrounding the 
country’s leading stock exchange in Frankfurt, the presence of Anglo-American decision-
makers at German supervisory and executive boards, and the wider shift towards “value-
oriented” corporate governance models (see, for instance, Berndt 2001; Clark et al. 2002; 
Deeg 1999). 
How does all this affect labor in Germany? Even if there is evidence for upgrading in Eastern 
European countries such as Hungary where simpler tasks are already moving further east or 
southeast (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia), outsourcing decisions to Eastern Europe are main-
ly driven by cost considerations. The limited evidence available suggests that there is a corre-
lation with the shrinking demand for so-called “low-skilled” and increasingly also “medium-
skilled” work in Germany (see, for instance, Geishecker 2006). And the pressure exerted by 
 5
foreign and domestic investors above all on the management of manufacturing firms further 
intensifies the search for inefficiencies and low cost alternatives. It is no surprise therefore, 
that it is workers with a lack of or “wrong” professional skills who are amongst the main los-
ers of the changes, in particular since there are few alternative sources of employment. 
As German companies followed the lead of their foreign competitors and built up transnation-
al production, supplier and marketing networks, the territorialized institutions governing labor 
and industrial relations in Germany were put under tremendous pressure. The balance of pow-
er between capital and labor shifted gradually as the state additionally introduced supply side 
measures in an attempt to restore competitiveness. Yet, international competition made it 
more and more difficult to finance the continuing increase in German wages and productivity 
by expanding product markets. Companies instead reverted to the “downsizing” of their work-
forces partly with the help of the state which allowed employers to socially externalize the 
costs of restructuring. These strategies to reduce the quantity of labor (e.g. early retirement, 
reduction of working time) soon overstretched the already weakened social security system to 
an extent that these comfortable ways to “dispose” of excess (low-skill) labor supply had to be 
closed, further aggravating the problem. The alternative option, the improvement of the em-
ployability of workers via skilling (i.e. increase in the quality of labor), was only considered a 
viable option by companies for the shrinking core of their workforces. Core employees were 
subjected to various flexibilization strategies designed after managerial models emanating 
from companies, think tanks and business schools located in the US or in Japan. The wider 
task of improving the qualifications and skills of the “losers” of the changes was left to the 
state which appears to lack the financial and organizational means to do so. It is little surpris-
ing therefore that marginalized segments of the workforce had to settle with the remaining 
option, a strategy to lower the price of labor in order to compete with “human capital” in 
those countries which profit from the influx of German FDI.  
All this had serious consequences for the intermediate actors representing both sides of the 
collective bargaining process. Both employers’ associations as well as labor unions suffered a 
large-scale decline and a deep fragmentation of their membership base, a process gaining 
momentum with the collapse of the industrial base in East Germany. During the 1990s union 
membership declined to such an extent that in 2000 there were no more union members in 
united Germany than there had been in West Germany in 1990 (see Fig. 1). So far, both tradi-
tional “social partners” and in particular the labor unions still have not found an adequate or-
ganizational response to the decentralization and rescaling of collective bargaining, some-
times openly resisting, sometimes proactively accelerating (e.g. allowing differential wage 
settlements for firms in different economic conditions) and quite often simply looking the 
other way (Streeck and Hassel 2004: 113; see also Berndt 2000). 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
With German capital increasingly substituting low-road price for high-road quality competi-
tion, workers are confronted with downward pressure on wages and a rise of “abnormal”, that 
is, precarious employment. All this occurs in a context of profound ideological change, a 
“new social consensus” providing the basis for the changing balance of power and the recon-
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figuration of capital-labor-relations in Germany. With differences in detail, the main political 
actors formulate their recipes against a perceived “German disease” on the basis of often sim-
plistic arguments. First, there is the free market topos, that is the unquestioned assumption 
that one only needs to reestablish “freedom of contract” in the labor market (and to scale back 
the reassuring promise of employment stability) in order to bring about positive employment 
effects. Linked to this is the second topos, the normative position of welfare contractualism 
which provided the ideological fodder for the welfare reforms initiated by the Clinton Admin-
istration or by New Labor in the UK. In Germany the workfare ideology was implemented by 
the second Schröder administration (2002-2005) with the so-called Hartz-Gesetze, transported 
by the infamous catchphrase “fordern und fördern” (lit. to demand and support). 
Transnational labor geographies: Ambivalent responses to a mobile world 
I am now turning to the question of how sedentary stakeholders of the German Model respond 
to the challenges outlined above. This will be done in two steps. I start with more recent, 
proactive measures involving attempts to transnationalize labor relations. Yet, I argue that by 
and large these measures have not borne the expected fruits, organized labor and state repre-
sentatives falling back to tested and tried, territorially embedded relations instead and formu-
lating reactive strategies mainly designed to strictly control cross-border mobilities (capital 
outwards, labor inwards). 
Movement over borders: Building transnational networks 
“In a connexionist world […]”, argue Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello (2005: 363), “some 
people’s immobility is the precondition for the profits others derive from their ability to move 
around.” The dominance of global capital is not so much based on its transnational networks 
per se, but on the mobilization of resources in this networks vis-à-vis less mobile actors, 
above all workers and labor unions. It is obvious therefore that a true counterweight can only 
be established, if labor rises beyond regional and national containers and attempts to match 
the transnational networks constructed by capital. Labor unionists and activists more general-
ly have realized this and have started to build cross-border solidarity in cases were workers 
were being played out against each other. 
A good example for this strategy is the instrument of European Works Councils (EWC) which 
is heralded by some as new actors participating in the establishment of a transnational system 
of industrial relations. However, observers are very cautious as to the effects of this instru-
ment. Albeit acknowledging that the EWC constitute a long overdue step towards cross-
border networking and coordination, they criticize the limited space for active engagement on 
the part of labor representatives (see Gohde 2005; Wills 2000). German labor representatives 
in particular are skeptical towards the EWC, a skepticism translating into very hesitant im-
plementation of the 1994 EU-directive. Immersed into cross-border European production 
networks like no other EU member state, Germany counts the largest number of multination-
als affected by the directive. However, numbers for 2005 illustrate that with a relative share of 
only 27.3 % actually realized EWCs (123 out of 450; see Fig. 2) Germany is amongst the bot-
tom countries compared to the remaining EU 15 member states and Switzerland and Norway 
(see also Kerckhofs 2006). 
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Insert Figure 2 here 
 
The slow adoption of the instrument is easily explained given that there are two optional blue-
prints for the establishment of a EWC: the German variant with a council exclusively made up 
by labor representatives and the French one, where labor and capital representatives make up 
one half of the members each. Roughly two thirds of the EWC follow the French model. Giv-
en that the majority of EWCs constitute a step backwards for German labor representatives, 
they prefer to revert to tested and tried routines and coalitions, utilizing the EWC predomi-
nantly from a national perspective. Two recent examples illustrate this argument: 
The first concerns a bitter dispute surrounding an Electrolux plant in Nuremberg after the 
management of the Swedish household appliance producer announced the closure of the plant 
in December 2005. After 83 years of delivering washing machines and dish-washers to Ger-
man households under the well-established AEG brand, the Electrolux executive board de-
cided to shift production to facilities in Poland (Siewierz and Zarów), and to a plant in Italy. 
The relocation decision affected 1,750 jobs and is part of a corporate restructuring program 
designed to regain competitiveness in an extremely tight global market by reducing the num-
ber of plants in high wage countries. This decision pitted workers in Germany against workers 
in Poland and also in Italy. However, apart from a European wide action day organized on 21 
October 2005 by the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) there was little pan-
European solidarity, affected workers instead reverting to localized protests embedded in es-
tablished regional and national support networks. More importantly, though not surprising, 
labor representatives did not succeed in linking up the “winners” in Poland and also in Italy 
with the “losers” in Nuremberg. This fragmentation of interests occurred despite the existence 
of a EWC which was agreed upon and signed on 3 February 1995. 
The second, more positive example only contradicts this assessment at first sight. In the aca-
demic literature the EWC at General Motors Europe (GME-EWC) is frequently taken as a 
role model exhibiting relatively advanced transnational structures. Indeed, by using the in-
strument, labor representatives have been able to minimize the damage of recent restructuring 
measures and to at least keep the competition pitting individual plants against each other at 
bay. When the GM management threatened to close plants in the wake of decisions about the 
so-called “epsilon platform” (e.g. Opel Vectra) in 2004, the situation almost escalated after an 
Opel plant in Rüsselsheim (Germany) and a Saab plant in Trollhättan (Sweden) were singled 
out as possible candidates. Using the communication lines offered by the EWC, local works 
councils reached an informal agreement not to engage in competitive undercutting. The con-
flict ended with a framework agreement negotiated by the EMF and the GME EWC, and the 
GME management, laying down obligatory rules of conduct for the restructuring process 
which have to be honored by all European production locations. In addition to this, the 
agreement included a medium-term renunciation of plant closures and the fair distribution of 
the costs of restructuring between all plants. Whatever one might think about the outcome, 
GM was not able to break the ranks of the works councilors and union representatives, thus 
being largely unable to play off one plant against each other. In similar vein, works council 
members in Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, Poland and Sweden signed an agreement that 
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commits them to negotiate according to a common strategy and to refrain from solo efforts 
when GM recently announced that various plants have to compete for the production of the 
new Astra generation (“delta platform”; Scherrer and Weinert 2005). 
The relative positive effect of the GME-EWC for German high-wage locations can be ex-
plained with the composition of the institution. Although being implemented alongside the 
French model, German representatives enjoy a comfortable position. The majority of the 
council members are delegates from German plants, the EWC head therefore routinely having 
a German passport. This balance of power sees to it that the interests of potential “losers” of 
restructuring are better taken into account, minimizing potential gains of potential “winners”. 
Both examples demonstrate that regional and national interests play a crucial role when orga-
nized labor attempts to catch up with the transnationalization strategies implemented by capi-
tal. One the one hand, the conflicts accompanying these attempts are logical consequences of 
strategies to harmonize institutions which have very different historical roots. On the other 
hand, and this is most obvious in the Electrolux case, they are testimony of the huge dilemmas 
German organized labor is confronted with. Enjoying a relatively comfortable position in 
Germany it makes more sense at least at first sight to stick with the fragmented status quo of 
national systems of labor regulation. At the same time, however, is it difficult to imagine any-
thing else than some sort of renunciation of coveted achievements (codetermination, wages 
etc.), if the transnational card is to be played effectively in the future. 
Borders over movement: Labor vagabonds, sedentary workers and the territorial state 
The argument so far dealt with the increasing ability of mobile capital to take advantage from 
a pan-European labor market by moving production activities abroad. The situation for more 
place dependent production, above all certain service activities is a different one. For these 
activities transnationalization means that it is labor that moves towards the site of production, 
thereby allowing sedentary capital to enjoy the advantages of a flexible workforce segment, 
too. Here, the dilemmas of the two relatively immobile stakeholders of the German Model, 
the state and labor, get particularly visible. Notwithstanding internal fragmentation and con-
flicts of interest, both unions and governments at different spatial scales routinely respond 
with contradictory and “conservative” measures one-sidedly informed by methodological na-
tionalism. The phrase “borders over movement” illustrates this. 
Contradictions are particularly evident in the context of low-paid labor migration, above all 
from East Central Europe (ECE) countries. It was recent EU-enlargements in particular that 
gave the processes in question new dynamism. Citizens from new EU-member states are al-
lowed to travel to Germany without restrictions and are legally entitled to stay there for a pe-
riod of up to three months. While countries such as the UK, Ireland or Sweden agreed to si-
multaneously open their labor markets, Germany adopted a more restrictive policy, making 
use of provisions which allow the closure of the labor market for a maximum period of seven 
years. With regard to the A8-states (the countries entering the EU in 2004) this is managed in 
line with the so-called 2+3+2 model according to which Germany has the right to apply for 
three periods of grace as long as certain conditions are fulfilled (e.g. high domestic unem-
ployment). The German Parliament has recently voted to seek the final two year period (end-
ing in April 2011). 
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Given that German businesses and private households appear to be as dependent on the em-
ployment of low-paid Eastern European workers as their counterparts in other EU-15 coun-
tries, local authorities have to individually scrutinize each individual case. Even if responsible 
officials are instructed to grant exemptions only very restrictively, it is possible at least in 
principle for individual migrants to enter the country and apply for a work permit, provided 
they are able to prove three months of continuous residence and have a potential employer. 
However, the vast majority of ECE labor migrants legally working in Germany do so under 
the auspices of bilateral agreements (above all seasonal work, contract work, sectoral exemp-
tions). German law provides various legal codes with a veritable maze of stipulations and ex-
emptions, to an extent that reliable statistical information is impossible to get. The current 
national migration report (BAMF 2006), for instance, lists no more than 63 exceptions, rang-
ing from seasonal work in agriculture and contract work in construction to exotic cases such 
as “specialty chefs” or “models, dress men and mannequins”. For A8 workers alone, local and 
national authorities issued a total of almost 1.2 million work permits from 2004 to 2007 
(source: ZAV unpublished). Given these astonishing figures, one might speculate that the 
non-transparent nature of the measures serves two purposes: First, to hide from view the true 
scale of the phenomenon and the extent to which the German economy depends on low-wage 
migrant at a time of a difficult labor market situation; second to control labor mobility, flexi-
bly adjusting quotas in line with economic necessities. In order to achieve this, state authori-
ties put up with considerable bureaucratic costs. 
A further example concerns ongoing discussions about the introduction of sectoral minimum 
wages with the so-called Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetze (= law over the sending of workers). 
The first was put into effect within the construction sector in 1996, requiring any foreign 
company that sends employees to Germany to pay the wage set by the respective collective 
agreement. This measure has recently been extended towards commercial cleaning. Once de-
clared mandatory for the whole industry, the lowest wage band in the collective agreement 
negotiated by employers and unions effectively defines a legally binding minimum wage. 
And finally, there is the phenomenon of so-called “illegal” employment of migrants. On the 
one hand are those workers who enter the country without the necessary documents. With the 
exception of a few case-studies (see Alt 1999; Cyrus 2000) the empirical picture is still ex-
tremely patchy. The lack of reliable data notwithstanding, there is evidence that a very restric-
tive practice of control by authorities to the contrary undocumented migration has been grow-
ing recently, a development connected to regressive national migration policies by some ob-
servers (Bommes 2006: 31). The majority of cases however concern labor migrants who hold 
residence titles and are being employed in Germany in breach of the labor law or collective 
wage agreements (Tarifverträge). In the respective industries and sectors, such as commercial 
cleaning, construction, or hotel and restaurants, criminal employers deviate from the agree-
ments with local labor offices, paying well below the wage set in the respective collective 
wage agreement or below the so-called “local average”, or reducing the hourly wage by de-
manding longer hours of work. It is non-EU citizens which are predominantly affected by 
these exploitative practices, given that their right to stay in Germany is dependent on a regular 
job.  
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Geographically, larger cities and urban agglomerations constitute the foci of these labor flows 
(with the obvious exception of agriculture). In a recent study focusing on the Frankfurt region, 
Krieger et al. (2006) give three reasons for this: The first concerns the local labor market. 
Frankfurt’s business sector provides a sizeable number of jobs in various sectors, ranging 
from construction, commercial cleaning, transport, gardening, care and entertain-
ment/prostitution. To this one has to add the similarly high demand from the sizeable share of 
relatively wealthy private households for support in cleaning, private care, gardening etc. The 
second reason is linked to Frankfurt’s cosmopolitan demography, providing the family and 
ethnic networks which alleviate the job search for migrants without legal residency. And, fi-
nally, there is the role of Frankfurt as a major transport hub, the airport in particular making 
the city a natural destination for incoming migrants. On the one hand Frankfurt serves as “city 
on the way”, as stop-over en route to other European and German metropoles. On the other 
hand, transit migrants often stay longer than intended, literally getting stuck in Frankfurt. 
In the light of these developments, critics take issue with the protectionist nature of the policy 
responses, either being uneasy with thinly veiled nationalist attempts to protect German 
workers by keeping foreigner out or the union’s efforts to protect the well-paid stable jobs of 
a declining core workforce by demanding an end to social dumping (Offe 1999: 214). Advo-
cates point to the less mobile losers in this competition, German workers with little or no 
skills, companies which cannot easily follow the offshoring and outsourcing routes taken by 
their competitors, or the state at different levels having to forfeit taxes and social security 
dues. This is a debate which does not have easy answers and solutions. However at a second 
glance, it is possible to identify two reasons for the gap between government rhetoric and 
concrete political practice. The first is that the labor migrants are simply indispensible. For 
large parts of the German population it is self-evident to lead relatively stable, sedentary life-
styles. These are life-styles, however, that presuppose global connections and cross-border 
mobility. And second, if one looks behind the rhetorical façade it gets obvious that all-
encompassing control is impossible. Border security measures are simply evaded in daily mi-
gratory practices, for instance in cases where labor migrants routinely renew their three 
months residence title at the border without applying for formal work permits. A Polish mi-
grant working in a private Frankfurt household describes a wide-spread practice: 
“At that moment we were no longer required to have a visa. I was allowed to stay in Germany for three months. This 
is why I went back to Poland roughly every three months, to get a new stamp at the border. I simply was a tourist in 
Germany” (Interview 30 December 2006). 
Reacting to the restrictions applying to waged labor migrants after EU enlargement, another 
wide-spread way to undermine the sovereignty of the state available to ECE migrants is the 
registration of a business and of self-employment. A Lithuanian construction worker explains 
how he registered two quite disparate businesses: 
“When they admitted Lithuania to the EU, my employer, I have been working for him from the beginning, suggested 
that I registered my own business. This because I was caught working illegally once. (...) Normally I am working as 
an electrician, but I registered two businesses, one as electrician, another as translator – Russian, Lithuanian and 
German” (Interview, 10 March 2007). 
In another interview, Frankfurt representatives of the Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit, the or-
ganization responsible for policing illegal work practices, refer to “bogus self-employment” 
(“Scheinselbstständigkeit”) and mention cases where migrants registered up to 20 different 
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businesses or – the other extreme – extremely specialized activities such as the cleaning of 
glasses in the food processing industry (Interview 22 February 2006). These practices result in 
a marked increase in the overall share of self-employment and in the numbers of eastern Eu-
ropean “businesses”. In Frankfurt, for instance, a recent study identified Polish firms as the 
largest group within the international business community (Behrend et al. 2007). A look at 
business registration data confirms this picture at the national level. Counting only 2,366 cas-
es in 2002, the number of Polish business increased to 16,704 in 2004 and 38,477 in 2007 
respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007).  
Overall, government responses to labor migration have not changed much over the last dec-
ades. The sovereignty of the state is legitimized above all through the capacity to define crite-
ria for inclusion and exclusion, in so doing being able to decide over the access of “foreign-
ers“ to the state territory. Migration, it its manifold disguises, therefore constitutes a structural 
challenge for the territorial nation-state (Bommes 2000; Wimmer 1999). This is why migra-
tion continues to be represented as a temporary process in official statements, the product of 
simple pull and push factors, individual decisions and criminal activities. This is the tradition-
al sedentary perspective on migration, a temporary state of mobility interrupting a normal 
sedentary life. Migration studies however have shown that in a global world this classical mi-
gration pattern is increasingly becoming supplemented by new migration realities. It is at least 
as “normal” for a growing number of people to live a mobile life, regular periods “on the 
move” framing temporary periods of stability. Another Polish labor migrant, working in do-
mestic services in the Frankfurt region, explains how she regularly takes turn with her mother, 
commuting between Poland and Germany every two months: 
“Whenever you take on a job it is normally the case that you stay for a period of two months or so. It depends on the 
details of the agreement. (...) As I said, we take turns every two months. My mother leaves Aschaffenburg [city lo-
cated close to Frankfurt] and I arrive, she goes to Poland. Then it is she who comes back and I go back, as long as it 
works for the both of us” (Interview, 29 June 2006). 
This example is supported by empirical studies that clearly demonstrate the extent to which 
current migratory practices deviate from the traditional picture. “Legal” and “illegal” migra-
tion projects both produce and utilize transnational social networks creating new social reali-
ties which stretch beyond the territorial border of one or two nation-states (Alt 2003). 
 
Paradoxical b/orderings 
In this section I seek to make sense of the empirical examples given above, connecting the 
transnational labor geographies of a fledgling global with the national regulatory compromis-
es of a crumbling territorial order. Although continuing to use Germany as the main reference 
point, I believe that there are lessons to be drawn for the analyses of labor geographies in oth-
er contexts. 
The focus of this section is on the political borders which frame national economies. Debates 
over economic globalization still often inadequately take into account that the movements of 
capital, goods and people occur in the context of an ambivalent double play of debordering 
and rebordering processes. Territorial borders are not only eliminated and eroded, they are 
reproduced and sharpened at the same time. It is more adequate to assume therefore that bor-
ders are made contingent: “Globalization goes hand in hand with an accentuation of borders, 
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an intensification of border controls: These new borders, however, do not work like the old 
ones. They resemble Swiss Cheese, holes and uncertainties being systematically built in to 
simultaneously safeguard the flow of information, capital and people” (Beck 2002: 143; my 
translation). This quote refers to the asymmetric nature of globalization processes, sensitizing 
for the observation that the realities of our global age are to a large extent being negotiated 
around the axis mobility/immobility. Diverging interests between relatively mobile and rela-
tively sedentary actors fracture the ranks of all stakeholders of the German variant of capital-
ism, resulting in ambivalence and uncertainty. This can be illustrated on the example of the 
three main social actors of German corporatism: 
 
Capital. Businesses are normally regarded as the winners of the ongoing globalization of rela-
tions of production, exchange and circulation. Seen from the perspective of capital, the new 
power geometry results from the ability to exploit locational differences, actively pushing 
national and regional actors to compete against each other. An indispensable precondition for 
geographical arbitrage is a technoscape of uniform standards and norms which provides the 
global frame of reference allowing corporate decision-makers to compare, classify and 
benchmark individual production sites. In order for this finely tuned regime of global standar-
dization (e.g. quality norms) and territorial differentiation (e.g. wages, taxes, regulations) to 
work and to maintain its organizational flexibility, it is crucial for capital to be more mobile 
than other actors, such as the state or labor. It is obvious that it is to the advantage of capital, 
if the latter continue to base their decisions largely on the established territorial order. 
This logic holds only for those businesses, however, which have a certain size and more than 
one plant, being capable of arranging internal competition for lucrative orders. The conflicts 
at Electrolux and GM Europe discussed earlier are a good example for this. The situation for 
less mobile, more place bound businesses is different, sedentary capital having different inter-
ests. The conflicts within the employers’ camp during recent wage bargaining rounds, for in-
stance, can to a large degree be explained with mobility mismatches. This holds above all for 
industries which find it difficult to make use of the opportunity to relocate production activi-
ties (e.g. construction, agriculture, consumer-oriented services). These businesses utilize an 
emerging transnational European labor market in a different way: The recruitment of workers 
from the growing pool of Eastern European labor migrants. 
It is obvious that both sides within the capital camp pursue different strategies with regard to 
migration policy. While the former are above all interested in unfettered cross-border mobility 
of capital and high-skilled employees, the latter’s focus is on as unbureaucratic an access to 
the German labor market for predominantly low-paid labor migrants as possible. 
 
Labor. Whether institutionalized in unions and works councils or as individual worker, labor 
has been forced on the defense in the global age. All the more important are measures of be-
lated transnationalization, such as implemented by individual labor unions bilaterally or by 
labor representatives in the context of the EWC instrument. Successful upscaling by labor can 
be interpreted as a threat to the competitive advantage of mobile capital. Yet, on the labor side 
measures like these necessarily depend on a sizeable, homogenous group with common inter-
ests. In Germany this is provided by the personalized core of Modell Deutschland, the normal 
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worker embedded in the “standard” work relation (i.e. full-time, unionized, industrial em-
ployment, male). It is little surprising therefore that the relatively successful examples of 
transnational union activism all involve this segment of the German economy, mainly large 
companies often dominating oligopolistic domestic markets. However, it is also little surpris-
ing that the results of concerted, transnational action often “only” remain defensive, providing 
– as important as it may be – a frame for controlled downsizing or for spreading the costs of 
restructuring less unevenly across production sites in different countries. 
From the perspective of organized labor the erosion of the standard form of employment con-
stitutes a dilemma which is almost impossible to solve, making it a lot more difficult to suc-
cessfully transnationalize organized labor practices for two reasons. First, to a large extent it 
is the “normal worker” who holds membership and keeps unions alive. Given that this shrink-
ing segment of the workforce enjoys relatively high labor standards and wages, the legitimacy 
of unions crucially depends on the defense of these achievements. This is why German union-
ists and works councilors regard instruments such as the EWC predominantly as a means to 
export the benefits of the German system of labor regulation to other countries. This is a noble 
cause, but not necessarily in the interests of labor elsewhere which explains the frictions and 
limits to truly transnational coordination whenever global players announce restructuring pro-
grams. As the Electrolux and GM cases aptly illustrate, the odds are still relatively good as 
long as German workers play a strong role in the companies involved. However, in the wake 
of the belated but nonetheless dramatic financial transnationalization of what has traditionally 
been termed Deutschland AG (= Germany Inc.), this position is eroding. In an environment 
like this it is difficult to imagine anything else than some sort of renunciation of coveted 
achievements (codetermination, wages etc.), if the transnational card is to be played effective-
ly in the future. 
The second reason concerns relations to workers in the south or east. On the one hand are 
those segments of the workforce that perform tasks within production and value chains in 
which other regions were able to achieve an upgrading process. The closer the labor produc-
tivity gap becomes, the stronger is the competition between domestic and foreign workers and 
appeals for transnational solidarity fall on deaf ears. On the other hand are those remaining 
segments of the workforce which continue to enjoy a productivity premium over foreign 
workers. The problem for these workers is that they appear to profit less and less from the 
wealth generated from this advantage, being confronted instead with stagnating or falling real 
incomes and a general environment of insecurity. Again, this provides little incentive for 
transnational solidarity with workers elsewhere (see Scherrer 2006). 
It is little wonder therefore that unions are caught in contradictions. Union migration policy 
was predominantly directed towards the classical, longer-term migrant, that is, guest-workers 
and their emancipation and integration. These policies are largely ineffective with regard to 
more flexible and increasingly circular migration patterns. As a consequence of this, labor 
unions are faced with particularly stark dilemmas regarding their treatment of these migrants. 
Too positive an attitude may result in lower wages and costs for the domestic workforce. An 
overtly restrictive attitude does not chime well with the tradition of international solidarity 
and also neglects that there are always sectors that suffer from a lack of labor supply or that 
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labor migrants often occupy niches vacated by domestic workers (Schmidt and Schwenken 
2006). 
In the face of these problems German unions tend to retreat into restrictive positions, attempt-
ing to defend the national-territorial system of labor regulation with demands for controls and 
sanctions. By representing low-wage labor migration predominantly as a labor supply pheno-
menon underlying contradictions are easily disguised. Yet if the increasing demand for the 
services of low-wage migrants is taken into consideration, it is obvious that comfortable se-
dentary life-styles greatly depend on both the mobility of relatively cheap goods and labor. A 
quite paradoxical situation: Put in jeopardy by an increasingly mobile world, a once success-
ful territorial economic system increasingly has to rely on these very movements, movements, 
however, that in turn put its longevity further into question. 
 
State. Compared to the actors on the capital side the state is also portrayed as losing out in the 
wake of globalization. Being “about fixity rather than motion” (Harvey 2006: 106), the state 
lost much of its power, for instance, the – self-inflicted – loss in importance of national mone-
tary or industrial policy. However, a more differentiated analysis is warranted here as well 
(see Zeller 2003). It has largely been the state itself that was responsible for the contingentiza-
tion of its borders. This is done in the name of sedentary actors both on the capital and the 
labor side, and is shot through with contradictions. On the one hand, there is a need to grant 
sedentary actors access to inexpensive labor migrants. This is in the interest of place-
dependent service businesses, which are confronted with increasing competition in the wake 
of liberalization measures implemented by the EU, as well as private households which safe-
guard their still relatively comfortable life-styles with the help of labor migrants. On the other 
hand, the state is under considerable pressure to protect those domestic workers and business-
es that are in direct competition with labor migrants or foreign firms sending workers to Ger-
many. The decision to make full use of the seven year transition period for legal entry to the 
German labor market for workers from new EU member states was as much supported by 
labor unions, business associations and political decision-makers as the gradual introduction 
of legal minimum wages for sectors deemed sensitive (construction and industrial cleaning). 
Policy responses to the current round of EU enlargement are a good example for these dilem-
mas. On the one hand German authorities pursue restrictive policies, making full use of the 
possibilities to delay full liberalization. On the other hand there is a huge interest in the pres-
ence of low-paid ECE labor migrants in the German labor market. For the overstretched Ger-
man social security system is best served with migrants who only stay in the country during 
their productive age and who incur only limited costs (health care, education etc.). Employers, 
whether corporate or private, are often only able to pay low wages because social reproduc-
tion largely takes place elsewhere (e.g. when the rest of the family remains in the country of 
origin). While adopting an anti-immigration rhetoric and implementing strategies against “il-
legal” migration, nation-states at the same time actively contribute to short-term labor flows 
by introducing cross-border mobility programs and temporary quotas exclusively tailored 
towards the flexible labor needs of employers in their countries. 
It is these contradictions that appear to be partly responsible for the array of exceptions, spe-
cial cases, bilateral agreements and procedural instructions which gave rise to a non-
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transparent regime of labor market access, for which Beck’s graphic comparison with Swiss 
cheese appears to be an understatement. However, it is also possible to interpret these contra-
dictory and complicated regulations as a clever measure to hide from view the true scale of 
cross-border labor migration, the collection of ever more detailed statistical data helping the 
state to maintain the illusion that the phenomenon is kept under control. This is how the con-
ceptualization of borders as being made contingent has to be understood: A finely tuned, high-
ly flexible b/ordering regime which is constantly adjusted to the needs of sedentary actors 
(businesses, unions, workers, private households etc.). 
 
Conclusion 
I started my paper with a stylized juxtaposition of the German Model in the territorial and the 
global age. The main argument was that increasing mobility and transnational availability of 
labor and capital contributed to the erosion of an established territorial economic order. To 
this one has to add an important reservation: The national/territorial age only successfully 
created the illusion of quasi-natural territorial containment, that is, the production of the na-
tional “has always occurred across borders, by violating borders, that is always trans-
national” (Beck 2002: 82; my translation; author’s emphases). The meta-narrative of the terri-
torial model economy, still resurrected regularly today in Germany and abroad, is only been 
plausible as long as the underlying contradictions remain invisible. Take, for instance, the 
crucial role of mobile labor from Mediterranean countries during the immediate post-war dec-
ades. These transnational conditions for success were made invisible by continuing reference 
to the labor migrants as “guests” long after it became clear that many of them were in Germa-
ny for good.  
In similar vein, the geographies of the transformation processes outlined above are far more 
complex than is permitted by the still wide-spread simplistic globalization debate. Unwanted 
truths of our global age veiled and disguised: The deeply contradictory approach towards 
“undocumented” migrants or the contradiction that Germany reacts restrictively to EU en-
largement on the one hand, while allowing numerous tightly regulated breaches in its border 
fortifications. Political and economic decision-makers have not yet found forward-looking, 
constructive responses to the challenges of an increasingly interwoven and mobile world. Ra-
ther than pursuing new ways of “governance in de-bordered spaces” (Habermas 2007; my 
translation), they conservatively retreat behind territorial walls. The nation-state, however, has 
changed dramatically. Or to put it with Claus Offe (1999: 218): The stakeholder of the Ger-
man Model have not yet fully realized that the “congruence of the scopes of interdependency 
and regulation which is what used to define a ‘national’ economy has ceased to exist”. 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), members and rate of organization 1980-2006 
 
 
* Numbers from 1991 onwards include East Germany. 
 
Source: DGB 2007 
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Fig. 2: European Workers Councils 2005 
 
Source: ETUI-REHS 2005  
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